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Abstract 
What explanations did economists advance for New Zealand's remarkable experience of full employment between 
1938 and 1980? What causes did they suggest for the breakdown and subsequent massive rise in unemployment? 
This paper categorises and critically surveys material on these questions as part of a wider project on New Zea-
land's post-war unemployment experience. 
This paper, part of a larger project on the creation and 
demise of full employment over the post-war perio<L 
examines what New Zealand economists have said about 
full employment in New Zealan<L why full employment 
broke down and why unemployment rose so steeply after-
wards.! Consideration of this literature aims to distil the 
collective wisdom of previous New Zealand researchers to 
enable a better story of our post-war unemployment expe-
rience to be told and to generate a set of hypotheses on full 
employment and its breakdown which can then be exam-
ined empirically in later work. 
In terms of coverage, my survey is 1epresentative rather 
than comprehensive. Adopting a representative approach 
eliminates repetition. 2 
The following questions arise: 
• to what cause did economists attribute New Zealand's 
remarkably low unemployment over much of the post-war 
'od? pen . 
• to what did they attribute the breakdown and consequent 
rise in unemployment? 
• wha~ in a preliminary sense, are strengths and weak-
nesses of their explanations? 
The underlying theoretical position from which I will 
consider the literature is the competing claims theory of 
unemployment developed over recent years by econo-
mists such as La yard, Nickell, Jackman, Bean and others. 3 
The competing claims theory of unemployment explains 
unemployment as the means of reconciling conflicting 
claims on output by workers (through their wage setting) 
and finns (through their price setting). 
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Early analyses of full employment 
The first serious attempt to address the issue of full 
employment can be found in a book containing proceed-
ings from a convention of the New Zealand Institute of 
Public Administration (Parker, 1953). A common theme 
coming through the book is a perception by participants of 
public demand for what they frequently refer to as 'over-
full employment' - vacancies in excess of the nmnbers 
registered as unemployed. 
The most pertinent articles are from Treasury officials: 
Lang's 'Price and Wage Policy' and Schnitt's 'Economic 
Stability and the Balance of Payments'. The underlying 
economic theory used to explain full employment is the 
Keynesian income-expenditure model, supplemented by 
an external constrain~ and with an inflationary gap theory 
of price level determination along the lines of that devel-
oped in Keynes's How the Pay for the War. 
Lang considers interactions between employment, effec-
tive demand, import controls and price and wage regula-
tions. At full employment, high aggregate demand creates 
an excess of imports over exports and balance of payments 
difficulties. Import controls are then used to ensure actual 
imports are in balance with foreign exchange earnings. 
Protection creates monopoly positions and places upward 
pressures on domestic prices which then need to be con-
trolled to avoid a wage-price spiral. Essentially Lang sees 
controls - both of imports and in domestic factor and 
product markets - as a necessary factor in achieving and 
maintaining full employment On the other hand Schnitt 
focuses attention solely on the external constraint with 
regard to stability. Schnitt' s personal view is that full 
employment and balance of payments stability do not 
require import control. He favours expenditure switching 
policies changing relative prices (either devaluation <r 
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tariffs) to raise returns on exporting and to reduce price 
elastic imports. thus easing the foreign exchange con-
straint and maintaining full employment 
The next serious analysis of full employment was Westrate ·s 
Portrait of a Modern Mixed Economy. published at the end 
of the 1950s. In 'The employment record for New Zealand 
dming the post-war decade•, Westrate (1959: 129) writes 
in recognising the unemployment miracle 
is unique, not only in the history ofN Z., but probably 
also in the history of capitalist and mixed economies 
generally. There is probably no other instance of such 
a long period of uninterrupted full employment. 
Full employment, argues W estrate, was built into the 
formal institutional structure of the economy and was 
accmled much weight by parliamentarians in speeches to 
the house (Westrate 1959: 125, n14). Thus Westrate also 
accmls informal institutions an important role in creation 
and maintenance of full employment 4 However, while he 
acknowledges that the idea of stability in wage earners' 
share of national income was built into the judgements of 
the Arbitration Court. unlike Lang be places little weight 
on formal institutions for wage setting in achievement or 
maintenance of full employment Regarding the Arbitra-
tion system, Westrate (1959: 245) concludes "we can say 
that the Court's influence on the general level of wages has 
probably been only small. that of a temporary break, 
especially to falls in wages". And unlike Lang, W estrate is 
sceptical of the contribution of import controls to full 
employment 
Why then did labour demand exceed supply? Two possi-
bilities are canvassed by Westrate. First. government fixed 
wages at a maximum below market clearing levels, as he 
argues that it did prior to 1950 under war-time controls. 
The second hypothesis is that wages lagged behind prices, 
which is what happened after 1950: ' [t]his is the simple 
explanation of that fact that overfull employment [regis-
tered unemployment exceeded by vacancies] persisted 
after 1950' (Westrate 1959: 133). Full employment, ac-
c<X"ding to Westrate, was the unintentional by-product of 
rising prices and lagging wages. 5 From the point of view 
of modem theory on wage determination. this implies 
workers were being constantly fooled by rising prices. To 
maintain unemployment at a rate lower than equilibrium 
requires constantly rising inflation under adaptive expec-
tations. With the advantage of hindsight, this does not 
appear to be an adequate description of the New Zealand 
economy during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Over much of the post-war period. Wolfgang Rosenberg 
wrote on the importance of full employment as the institu-
tional glue of the post-war economic structure of interlock-
ing institutions. He has a coherent theory behind achieve-
ment of full employment system which is the development 
of a strand of insulationist thinking evident in the book 
edited by Parker. Rosenberg's basic model of the why' s 
and how's of full employment is best articulated in Full 
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Employment. Can the New Zealand Economic Miracle 
Last? 
Writing in 1960, Rosenberg views the New Zealand full 
employment experience as providing a unique model for 
eliminating unemployment in a predominantly capitalist 
economy. Seasonal unemployment and immobility of 
workers in New Zealand were argued to be low, but for 
Rosenberg a prime reason why full employment was 
possible was use of fiscal and monetary policy to maintain 
the level of aggregate demand at full employment. 
The next question Rosenberg turns to is the conundrum 
which arises when full employment level of national 
income can only be achieved with a level of imports which 
exceeds expa:ts. Since, Rosenberg argues, a laissez faire 
government is unwilling to impose controls on imports to 
maintain full employment, it has no choice but to reduce 
deflate to balance the external accounts. In addition, as 
long as free capital mobility is maintained, a trade deficit 
implies a drain on the domestic money supply, reducing 
lending for consumption and investment. Thus, even in 
absence of direct government deflationary policies, the 
system has a tendency to stabilise at a point where exports 
equal imports, rather than at full employment. 
However, there is another innovative element in 
Rosenberg' s theory. A country has to generate foreign 
exchange not just to cover imports but also to pay interest 
and capital payments on outstanding net external debt 
(Rosenberg 1960: 27-28). Thus running a current account 
deficit and low unemployment today, according to 
Rosenberg, implies an interesting inter-temporal trade-off 
requiring lower activity tomorrow to ensure that imports 
decline by an amount sufficient to ensure the current 
account balance. 
The solution to leg-irons forged by foreign investtnent, 
capital mobility and the necessity to balance the supply of 
and demand for foreign exchange, Rosenberg (1960: 34-
36) argues, is import controls, reducing the demand for 
foreign exchange to pay for inessential imports, allowing 
the government to maintain full employment levels of 
demand without running the current account into deficit. 
The mainstream economic histories 
Consider the two major contributions to New Zealand's 
post-war economic history: John Gould' s The Rakes 
Progress andGaryHawke' s The Making ofNewZealand. 
Both these book were published on the cusp of change, 
before rapid liberalisation of the economy and the associ-
ated strong rises in unemployment. but certainly after 
breakdown in the full employment society had begun. 
Gould provides two major explanations for New Zealand 
unemployment perfonnance between 1945 and 1982. The 
first relates to expectations and labour hoarding. Under 
conditions of labour scarcity, a strong incentive exists in 
the private sector to hoard labour in times of slack demand. 
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When the good times again roll, as it was believed that they 
inevitably wool~ finns did not have to go to the expense 
of finding and re-hiring labour. 
The second point made by Gould is that during this period 
the 'natural' rate of unemployment in New Zealand was 
very low. A nmnber of reasons are offered for a low natural 
rate. First, Gould argues that regional unemployment in 
New Zealand in the early part of the post-war period was 
exceptionally low: 
Aggregate population growth was so rapid that even 
those regions which were shrinking relatively were 
not stuinking absolutely; while the latter almost cer-
tainly implies job losses, the fonner does not Moreo-
ver the industrial structure was relatively uncompli-
cated in comparison with those of advanced econo-
mies, with industries of relatively simple technology 
orientated almost exclusively to the domestic marke~ 
so that they were less likely to suffer either techno-
logical unemployment or deficiencies in demand 
induced by changes in export markets. Finally, the 
very tight labour market of the time minimised the 
time spent between jobs (Gould 1982:60). 
To explain the rise in unemployment during the 1970s, 
Gould reverses all these advantages. Regional contribu-
tions to structural unemployment seem to have increased, 
evidenced by widening regional income disparities. Slower 
population growth caused some areas to experience falling 
rather than stagnating popuJations.6 Industries began to 
cater to national and export markets, increasing linkages 
which created instability. Industrial concentration had also 
lead to regional concentration of industries in major cen-
tres. With growing technological change, the structure of 
labour demand began to change and a more specialised 
range of skills was demanded, leading to significant mis-
match.? While no empirical evidence is drawn on at this 
stage of Gould' s arguments, he later plots the ratio of 
registered unemployment and those on special work to 
registered vacancies. The ratio increases steadily from 
1946 untill980. This outward shift in the Beveridge curve 
could certainly be interpreted as evidence for growing 
structmal unemployment. 
A rather different set of explanations are offered by Hawke, 
who dates the breaching of full employment to the sharp 
recession of 1967-68 and the breakdown to the mid-1970s. 
Hawke places some emphasis on government policies 
providing a guarantee to the private sector that aggregate 
demand would grow at a sufficient rate to ratify investment 
decisions, generating stable expectations causing the 
economy to grow on the warranted growth path. However, 
little attention is paid to wage setting mechanisms in terms 
of full employment. 
Regarding the brealcdo~ Hawke claims: 
The supply of labour grew faster than before. Popula-
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lion growth acbJally slowed down, but because of the 
lag between diminished fertility and retardation of 
entry into the labour force - the effect of childhood -
the pmportion of the population in the working age 
years ( 15-64) rose from about 1960 and accelerated in 
the 1970s. To this was added an increased participa-
tion rate. That is, more people within the relevant age 
group wanted a job. A major element in this was the 
increased tendency of married women to seek or 
remain in employment (which, of course, offers no 
judgement on the desirability of such a trend). (Hawke 
1985: 324). 
Thus Hawke claims that labour supply increased at a faster 
rate from the 1970s onwards.8 The next part of his argu-
ment is that labour demand increased at a slower rate, 
partly as a result of puncturing expectations of continued 
low unemployment, resulting in lower labour hoarding by 
employers. Partly it was the result of rises in wage and 
other employment costs that caused substitution at the 
margin and longer run tendency towards technologies that 
embodied a higher capital-labour ratio. During the late 
1970s the slowing in private sector demand for labour was 
also reflected in the public sector. In addition, Hawke 
(1984: 327-328) suggests that there was a structural wors-
ening in the balance of payments constraint as a result of 
the oil crisis. Adjusting to this shift in the balance of 
payments led to contractionary fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. 
In addition to economic changes there were also changes 
in informal institutions- particularly government commit-
ment to full employment as a policy goal. Hawke argues 
that as the 1970s dawned there was a greater willingness by 
government to accept that there may be a trade-off between 
full employment and growth. Increasingly, it was sug-
gested that the high pressure economy which full employ-
ment required reduced efficiency as increasingly lower 
productivity employees were hired and unemployment 
played a weaker disciplinary function. In addition, high 
aggregate demand generated a trade deficit and a need for 
import controls to maintain external balance. Controls 
then begat inefficiency and slower short term growth. 
Some semi-official explanations 
With rising inflation, increasing industrial strife and a 
wage explosion, registered unemployment had begun to 
edge up over the 1970s. As a result of growing concerns 
about the breakdown of full employmen~ a debate amongst 
New Zealand economists developed regarding the rela-
tionship between real wages and unemployment9 In this 
section two semi-official explanations of the breakdown 
of full employment are considered. one from the Reserve 
Bank and the other from the 1988 Royal Commission on 
Social Policy. 
In a series of articles and working papers under the aus-
pices of the Reserve Bank, Arthur Grimes bought the issue 
of the relationship between real wages and unemployment 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
totbefore. In tenns of this pro~ the most relevant papers 
are Grimes (1981 C, 1982), since they outline the causes of 
tbe over-valued real wage which creates unemployment 
(Grimes 1982A: 51). Grimes' s econometric w<Xk on wage 
formation builds the so-called 'two tier' approach, ex-
plaining award wages by consumer prices, productivity 
and prevailing wages by award wages and another set of 
factors. The long run coefficients on award wages and on 
taxes are set to unity in the prevailing wage equation, a 
restriction accepted by the data. No evidence is foWld f<X' 
any influence of unemployment or excess demand on 
wage setting. 
Grimes 's conclusion is that prevailing wages are set exclu-
sively by supply-side factors. Given that his research 
programme reveals that labour demand responds inversely 
to real wages (Grimes 1981A, B), a coherent explanation 
of unemployment emerges, backed up by a considerable 
degree of empirical work. The tbeay is simple. Essentially 
if taxes increase workers will raise their wages to endeav-
our to maintain after-tax income. While consumption 
wages remain constant, product wages or the real wage 
faced by producers rise. This creates an increasing gap 
between the full employment wage and the wage demand 
by workers. Unemployment results. 
In tenns of actually explaining unemployment, Grirnes 
explains the impcxtance of tax rates in wage determination 
as a function of 'the monopolistic power of labour' (Grimes 
1982A: 51). Since the effective tax rate on wages and 
salaries rose from 13% to 26% between 1962 and 1979, 
Grimes's proximate explanation of the rise in unemploy-
ment immediately emerges. 
If tax rates increase, wages will rise. If no monetary 
expansion eventuates, Grimes argues, unemployment will 
increase. If monetary expansion does occur 'real effects 
may be avoided but inflation will remain as long as neither 
tbe unions n<I employers (nor government) are prepared to 
reducetheirrealclaimsonresources' (Grimes 1982A: 52). 
While similarities can be drawn between Grirnes' s work 
and the competing claims explanation of unemployment, 
the above quotation indicates some divergences. In the 
competing claims model, the rise in government claims 
causes inflation and consequently real exchange rate ap-
preciation as the external sector is squeezed in real terms. 
1be implications of this for longer term unemployment, 
and indeed the international context of the New Zealand 
economy, are comparatively neglected in Grimes's analy-
. 
SIS. 
External fact<rs are however dealt with in considering the 
implications of tenns of trade changes for unemployment 
in the face of complete indexation of consumer prices to 
inflation. If the terms of trade fall, labour demand in the 
export sector declines. Since wages in the exports sector, 
as elsewhere, are determined by conswnerprices, employ-
ment in the exporting sector declines and with it unem-
ployment grows. 
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Thus rising Wlemployment is put down to terms of trade 
declines and rising taxes. If one is to offer an proximate 
explanation of the rise in unemployment in terms of rising 
tax rates on wages and salaries, an ultimate explanation 
requires an analysis of forces pushing up tax rates but 
Grimes provides little on this. 
Since the 1950s, New Zealand economists had recognised 
that full employment existed in a symbiotic relationship 
with the social welfare system. If full employment broke 
down, considerable fiscal pressures would be placed in the 
entire structure of social welfare. Therefore it is unsurprising 
that the Royal Commission on Social Policy addressed 
issues of the achievement and breakdown of full employ-
ment An account of the rise and fall of full employment is 
developed by Mabbet ( 1988A, B) in work for the Royal 
Commission on Social Policy. The work is less detailed 
and empirical than Grimes' s, but ranges more widely in 
search for explanation. 
Full employment was based on what Mabbet calls • the 
bread winner model' whereby the system generated a 
family wage which reproduced female dependence. The 
bread winner model was supported by high wage male jobs 
developed in the sheltered sector of the economy through 
protection (Mabbett 1988A: 567-8, 570). While border 
protection was initially used to maintain employment 
stability, increasingly the system of protection was seen as 
inefficient by Government. In addition, the margin for 
further extensions was rapidly disappearing. Thus by the 
1970s employment protection increasingly came to in-
volve industrial subsidies and direct public sector job 
creation, especially after the flrst oil shock. While most 
border protection was fiscally cheap, Mabbet points out 
that industrial subsidies and direct government job crea-
tion were not. 
Mabbet locates the achievement of low unemployment 
finnly in the context of New Zealand wage determination 
system: 
In the 1950s and 1960s the system was successful at 
maintaining a low rate of wage increase. despite low 
unemployment. In the 1970s it broke down. with local 
bargaining becoming widespread. The advantage of a 
' second tier' of bargaining greatly increased the infla-
tion generated by the system. The A[rbitration] C[ourt] 
and the central organisations of workers and employ-
ers were unable to control second tier bargaining, 
although the Government imposed wage controls at 
various times. {Mabbet 1988A: 539) 
Systemic breakdown is located in the late sixties by Mabbet, 
since this was the point at which major changes in the 
principle of protection occurred in terms of reductions in 
protection, substitution of tariff for quantitative controls 
on imports and export diversification. Wage setting insti-
tutions had evolved for a protected economy and therefore 
it was difficult to adapt them to an export driven growth 
rather than import substitution. Furthermore by 1968 the 
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wage bargaining system had broken down and by the 
1970s wage increases were beginning to squeeze the 
export sector. Thus devaluation and subsidies were used to 
help the export sector,leading to rising inflation and fiscal 
problems. These fiscal problems can provide an ultimate 
explanation of the rises in taxes that Grimes singles out as 
an explanation of increasing unemployment, although 
Mabbet does not draw this out 
As suggested in earlier studies, Mabbet points out support-
ing the wage determination system was government com-
mitment to full employment, partly as a legacy of the 
depression in the minds of politicians and voters, and 
partly a result of new tools of economic management, 
influenced by new Keynesian theories and the Fabian 
socialism of Beveridge and others. 
Issues of female labour force participation, raised by 
Haw lee and others, are addressed in detail by Mabbet in the 
context of full employment Strong pro-<;yclical female 
participation is put down to limited supply of impated 
luxuries making it not worthwhile to work in downturns 
since goods could not be obtained. In export-led upturns 
import controls eased, raising effective female wages. 
Thus, Mabbet argues, there was inter-temporal substitu-
tion in female labour supply. By the 1970s this pattern had 
ceased to function and secular trends were taking over. 
Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated a concern by New Zealand 
economists to address questions of why and how full 
employment was maintained and how it broke down.l 0 
Indeed, given the social importance of employment and 
the costs that unemployment places on ordinary people, it 
would be surprising if it were otherwise. Consideration of 
what New Zealand economists wrote provides a fertile 
array of hypotheses for examination, development, syn-
thesis, and empirical testing. 
The work examined above will be summarised within the 
framework of the competing claims model, first looking at 
wage- and price-setting, then considering the role of the 
external constraint and wrapping up by analysing aggre-
gate demand issues. 
Early explanations of full employment, couched explicitly 
or implicitly in terms of the Keynesian income and ex-
penditure model and a simple inflationary gap model of 
price-determination, look unbalanced today in tenns of a 
lack of systematic treatment of the supply-side of the 
economy. The question of how the economy could be run 
for so long at such high levels of demand without generat-
ing runaway inflation needs detailed explanation which 
was not provided in early studies of full employment. 
Regarding wage-setting and labour market institutions, 
Rosenberg does not consider them important, while Lang, 
while considering full employment to be a child of con-
trols, undertakes no detailed analysis of the role of the 
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Arbitration Comt and other elements of the wage-fixing 
system. This tradition is carried on by the two economic 
historians, Gould and Hawke. Grimes and Mabbet pay 
more attention to the supply-side. Grimes's explanation of 
breakdown of full employment focuses on wage-setting 
institutions as being detrimental to full employment in the 
face of negative tax and terms of trade shocks. He does not 
set out to address why these institutions appear to have 
worked for such a long period prior to the late 1970s. 
Mabbet's analysis of the interaction between economic 
development and wage-setting institutions is the most 
detailed and offers a useful base for further development 
and refinement which can build on the work of Grimes, 
amongst others. 
Growing structural unemployment is offered as a reason 
for the breakdown of full employment by Gould and to 
some extent by Mabbet Rising mismatch, be it industrial, 
occupational or regional, will raise aggregate wage pres-
sures at a given rate of unemploymen~ raising the equililr 
rium. The evidence for growing mismatch is mixed, and 
needs to be examined in more empirical detail. 
Withregardtoprice-settingbehaviour,theearlyKeynesian-
based analyses of Rosenberg and Lang, for example, 
suggests that price controls enabled effective demand to 
expand to high levels without creating inflationary pres-
sures. In addition, they worked to mitigate potential mo-
nopoly positions created by import controls. Others, in-
cluding Westrate and Mabbet, see import and price con-
trols as promoting inefficiency and contributing to New 
Zealand's productivity decline. As such, they may have 
helped create full employment in the short run, but in the 
long run undermined the system. Grimes pays no attention 
to price-setting behaviour and Hawke and Gould also pay 
it little heed. In the competing claims model of unemploy-
ment, the level and flexibility of prices influences the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. How New Zealand's 
system of price controls impacted on the level and flexibil-
ity of prices needs further examination, preferably via a 
combination of inductive history and econometrics. 
The external constraint is an important element of many 
analyses of full employment, including those ofRosenberg 
and Hawke. Rosenberg argues that import controls are the 
means of easing an external constraint. Hawke and others 
sees the external constraint as transmitting international 
shocks into New Zealand's unemployment rate and being 
a contributory factor behind the breakdown of full employ-
ment Rosenberg is the only economist to pay attention to 
possibilities for inter-temporally transfening unemploy-
ment via the current account, which is a useful way of 
looking at developments in New Zealand's unemploy-
ment rate through the 1970s and 1980s. While considering 
the external sector, Grimes is more interested in interac-
tions between the terms of trade, wage-setting and employ-
ment than to explicitly focus on external constraints. 
As a final consideration in terms of the competing claims 
unemployment model, consider the role of aggregate de-
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mand in the analyses of New Zaland's post-war unem-
ployment experience. Clearly the early stmes were based 
on Keynesian models which are very much demand-
driven. Low unemployment to a large degnx: was seen as 
arising out of a combination of high pivate expenditures 
and fiscal and monetary policy, especially by Rosenberg. 
As fashions in economic theory changed, so explanations 
ofNewZealand' s unemploymentexpaience become more 
supply-driven. Demand-side shocks still play a role in 
driving up unemployment in the work of Hawke and 
Mabbet for example, but little attention is placed on the 
role of hysteresis in unemployment in response to an 
aggregate demand shock.11 
Lastly, it is always tempting to explain rising unemploy-
ment definitionally in terms of labour supply growing 
faster than labour demand. Hawke, Mabbet and others 
have tried to explain the breakdown of full employment in 
part in terms of higher labour force growth dming the 
seventies. The problem with such an explanation is that it 
does not fit the empirical facts (see Chapple 1994C) and 
that it lacks a coherent theory of wage determination and 
unemployment In the competing claims theory of unem-
ployment, a higher labour force, ceteris paribus, puts 
downward pressure on real wages as unemployment rises. 
This causes inflation to decline and aggregate demand to 
rise until unemployment retmns to its previous equili~ 
rium level Thus equilibrium unemployment is invariant to 
tbe labour force. Ind~ this is the only stylised fact 
cmsistent with the economic history of capitalism. Thus to 
explain rises in unemployment in terms of labour force 
growth requires an explanation of why a rising labour force 
causes wage- or price-setting to change or makes persist-
encedrivers behind disequilibrium unemployment stronger. 
Future research 
Further interesting work in this area would include a 
detailed economic history of the post-war wage fiXing 
system and its implications for the macroeconomic behav-
iour. In addition, a history of post-warpricecontrol in New 
Zealand from a similar perspective would be invaluable. 
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Notes 
1 See Chapple (1994A, 1994B, 1994C) for some other 
early work resulting from this project A much longer 
version of this paper is forthcoming under the same title as 
this paper in the new year as an NZIER Working Paper. 
2 A full bibliography will be included in the NZIER 
Working Paper. 
3 The best introduction is Layard (1986). For use of the 
model to explain Britain's low post-war unemployment 
see Broadberry (1994). 
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